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SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL: APPLYING THE
SIGHT AND SOUND SEPARATION PROTECTION
TO ALL YOUTHS WHO ARE TRIED AS ADULTS
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Lauren Knoke*
American law treats youths within the criminal justice system with
contrasting impulses. In some cases, the law deems youths worthy of special
protections and places them within the juvenile justice system. In other
situations, however, it views youths as posing distinct dangers and funnels
them into justice systems designed for adults. So long as youths remain under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system, they are afforded the
protections of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA).
One of the JJDPA’s core protections, sight and sound separation, aims to
prevent youths from having any visual or spoken exchanges with
incarcerated adults when they are held in an adult facility. The
reauthorization of the JJDPA in December 2018 significantly strengthened
sight and sound separation protection for youths tried as adults in the
criminal justice system, affording them separation protections that are
relatively similar to those afforded to their counterparts tried within the
juvenile justice system. However, instead of immunizing all youths tried in
the criminal justice system from sight and sound contact with incarcerated
adults, the new statutory language includes a loophole for a presiding judge
to deem a youth ineligible for sight and sound protection if it is “in the
interest of justice” to do so.
The current application of the sight and sound separation protection thus
may leave a significant portion of the youth population vulnerable and
exposed to the dangers of adult facilities. A presiding judge can now look to
factors such as age, mental maturity, delinquency history, and more to
determine the rights of an incarcerated youth in an adult facility instead of
automatically providing him or her with complete protection. Therefore, this
Note argues that sight and sound separation’s statutory application should
be made even more comprehensive by providing for the unqualified inclusion
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2015, George Washington
University. I would like to thank Professor Ian Weinstein for his sage advice and direction
and the editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their hard work and thoughtful
feedback. I would also like to thank my family and Ryan for their endless support and
encouragement.
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of all youths who are charged and tried as adults within the criminal justice
system. Using judicial discretion to deny certain youths sight and sound
separation is discordant with the current legal understanding of the
emotional, physical, and cognitive vulnerability of youths, as demonstrated
in recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Therefore, the law should mandate
unconditional protection of all youths, as this may decrease the victimization
of youths and mitigate other negative consequences from a youth’s
interactions with incarcerated adults.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2005, just nine days after his seventeenth birthday, Kirk Gunderson
was arrested in Onalaska, Wisconsin.1 Although he was only seventeen years
old, Wisconsin law considered Kirk an adult.2 This made Kirk subject to the
jurisdiction of the criminal justice system,3 and he was incarcerated at La
Crosse County Jail—an adult facility.4 Kirk’s mother, Vicky Gunderson,
recounts that during his incarceration, older incarcerated individuals—some
who were triple Kirk’s age—taunted Kirk and called him “immature.”5 An
older, convicted sex offender told Kirk that he was “going to have him” and
then exposed himself to Kirk.6 Kirk wanted to continue pursuing a high
school diploma while in jail, but the adult facility only provided him with
educational materials for four hours per week; the counterpart juvenile
facility gave youths of a similar age closer to twenty-five hours of materials
per week.7 As a result, Kirk instead filled the majority of his time learning
from his “rotating adult cellmates” about the inner workings of jail culture.8
He was involved in numerous physical confrontations that left his face
bruised, but he refused to tell anyone what happened to him due to his fear
of facing repercussions from older incarcerated persons.9 This was Kirk’s
life during the four months he was held at La Crosse County Jail waiting for
his pending trial date. However, Kirk never found out when his case would
go to trial—he committed suicide while waiting.10
1. See Hearing on Assemb. B. 732 Before the Comm. on Corr. & the Courts, 2009–2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2010), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/parent-testimonials/
item/vicky-gunderson [https://perma.cc/27Q7-8YCL] [hereinafter Hearing on Assemb. B.
732] (statement of Vicky Gunderson).
2. See WIS. STAT. § 48.02(2)(1d) (2019) (“‘Adult’ means a person who is 18 years of age
or older, except that for purposes of investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to
have violated any state or federal criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance, ‘adult’
means a person who has attained 17 years of age.”).
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See Hearing on Assemb. B. 732, supra note 1.
5. See NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE
DANGERS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 11 (2007), http://
www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJJailing_Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKQ9-XQHF].
6. See Hearing on Assemb. B. 732, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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In the United States, there are roughly 32,000 incarcerated youths,11 like
Kirk, detained in adult facilities12 every year.13 Compared to their
counterparts who are held in juvenile correctional facilities, youths who are
incarcerated with adults face a heightened risk of a multitude of dangers,
including sexual assault and suicide.14 In part to reduce the risk of violence
committed against youths in adult facilities, Congress introduced the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 197415 (JJDPA), a federal law
that, among other things, provides funding to states that adhere to its four
core protections for incarcerated youth.16 One of the JJDPA’s core
protections17 is sight and sound separation, which mandates that incarcerated
youths may not be placed in situations in which they have any clear visual or
verbal contact that is “not brief and inadvertent” with adult incarcerated
persons.18 Sight and sound separation is supposed to increase the level of
safety for youths who are incarcerated with adults by providing for complete
11. The term “youth” does not simply mean individuals under the age of eighteen.
Because some states “extend the legal status” of youth only up to age seventeen, the term
“youth” can refer to a different population of individuals depending on applicable state law.
For the purposes of this Note, the term “youth” encompasses all individuals under the age of
eighteen since, as of 2016, forty-one of the fifty states and the District of Columbia use
eighteen as their age of majority. See Jurisdictional Boundaries, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION
(Mar.
27,
2017),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/
qa04102.asp?qaDate=2016&text=no&maplink=link2 [https://perma.cc/7WTE-JR5L]; see
also JEFFREY BUTTS & JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INST., THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN
YOUTH VIOLENCE: 1980 TO 2000, at 3 (2002), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/60381/410437-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-American-Youth-Violence.PDF
[https://perma.cc/33Z9-3YP6] (“Although it is convenient to label all offenders under age 18
as ‘juveniles,’ this is not a legal definition.”).
12. For the purposes of this Note, “adult facilities” refer to all jails, prisons, and detention
facilities within the criminal justice system. See AM. CORR. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT
LOCAL DETENTION FACILITIES 106–08 (2d ed. 1981), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
Digitization/83419NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCQ8-W7TZ].
13. See NEELUM ARYA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM CLINIC, GETTING TO ZERO: A 50STATE STUDY OF STRATEGIES TO REMOVE YOUTH FROM ADULT JAILS 7 (2018), https://
drive.google.com/file/d/1LLSF8uBlrcqDaFW3ZKo_k3xpk_DTmItV/view [https://perma.cc/
GEN2-5GZ4]; see also Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A
Conflict of Interests Violation Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles’
Due Process Rights, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 233, 242–43 (2005); Jessica Lahey, The Steep Costs
of Keeping Juveniles in Adult Prisons, ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2016/01/the-cost-of-keeping-juveniles-in-adult-prisons/423201
[https://perma.cc/7BYB-748F].
14. See Key Facts: Youth in the Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 5–6 (Feb.
22, 2018), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/factsheets/KeyYouthCrimeFacts
Feb222018Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/J38T-HDGM] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) [hereinafter
Key Facts].
15. Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
16. Id.
17. The JJDPA’s other three core protections are: the reduction of disproportionate
minority contact, the deinstitutionalization of statute offenders, and the removal of juveniles
from adult jails and lockups. See Compliance with the Core Requirements of the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://
www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/index.html [https://perma.cc/5KUB-QZWD] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019).
18. 34 U.S.C. § 11103(25) (2012).
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separation from such adults.19 Until December 2018,20 courts interpreted
this statutory protection to only cover youths who were detained in an adult
facility but were still under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system.21
It did not include youths who were detained in an adult facility but were tried
and sentenced under the criminal justice system as adults.22 However, on
December 21, 2018, Congress passed a bill that reauthorized the JJDPA for
the first time in sixteen years: the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018.23
This reauthorization significantly amended sight and sound separation
protection by implementing partial sight and sound separation between
youths tried as adults and incarcerated adults, an advancement in juvenile
rights that juvenile justice advocates had been working towards for almost
two decades.
However, instead of providing blanket protection for all youths held within
adult facilities, the law now allows judicial discretion in determining whether
it is “in the interest of justice” to allow a youth to be excluded from sight and
sound separation protection.24 This new loophole25 may leave numerous
youths vulnerable and unprotected, despite the JJDPA’s goal of
strengthening both the national standards for youth incarceration and the
practices implemented to protect all incarcerated youth.26
A youth’s age and vulnerability are judicially and scientifically recognized
by courts as mollifying sentencing factors for youths who are within in the
court system, in large part due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s unequivocal
recognition of the differences between youth and adult development.27
However, sight and sound separation, while certainly improved since the
JJDPA’s 2002 reauthorization,28 still has an undeveloped legislative
appreciation of youth development. This is because of the newly applicable

19. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN ADULT
PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 14 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
bja/182503.pdf. [https://perma.cc/F5LB-EMTZ].
20. However, states have three years from December 2018 to enact the amended sight and
sound separation provision. See Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205, 132 Stat. 5123, 5135 (2018).
21. Fact Sheet: Jail Removal and Sight & Sound Protections, ACT 4 JUV. JUST. 1 (2018),
http://www.act4jj.org/sites/default/files/ckfinder/files/ACT4JJ%20Core%20Protection%20Ja
il%20Removal%20and%20Sight%20Sound%20February%202018%20FINAL%20Revised.
pdf [https://perma.cc/L9B7-LYXU] [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
22. Id.
23. See Pub. L. No. 115-385, 132 Stat. 5123 (to be codified in scattered sections of 34 and
42 U.S.C.).
24. Id. § 205, 132 Stat. at 5135–36.
25. Before the reauthorization of the JJDPA in 2018, the “federal loophole” used to refer
to the fact that youths tried as adults within the criminal justice system were not afforded the
sight and sound separation protection. See ARYA, supra note 5, at 22; see also Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (amended 2018).
26. Rachel Marshall, Fed. Policy Counsel, Campaign for Youth Justice & Neelum Arya,
Author, Webinar at the Coalition for Juvenile Justice: Sight and Sound Separation and Adult
Jail Removal (Apr. 18, 2019).
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, div.
C, tit. II, subtitle B, 116 Stat. 1869 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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judicial discretion in determining whether it is “in the interest of justice” for
a youth to be shielded by sight and sound separation protection.29
Thus, in order to preserve the JJDPA’s mission of setting exemplary
practices for the protection of youth,30 this Note suggests that sight and sound
separation’s statutory application should provide a uniform sight and sound
contact protection from adult incarcerated persons for all youths under
eighteen who are tried as adults, without a judicial hearing to determine
whether a particular youth is worthy of such protection based on his or her
age, maturity, or any other relevant factor. Part I explores the development
of the juvenile justice system and how both statute and common law have
used (albeit in different ways) a youth’s age as a component in punishment
and sentencing determinations. Part II analyzes Congress’s implementation
of the JJDPA and how sight and sound separation’s application has evolved
since its inception in federal law. Part III discusses the exception, “in the
interest of justice,” that courts may use to exclude a youth from sight and
sound separation protection, which may leave a sector of the youth
population vulnerable while incarcerated in adult facilities. Part IV then
proposes dismantling the “in the interest of justice” exception and amending
the statute to provide blanket sight and sound protection from contact with
incarcerated adults for all youths who are tried as adults in the criminal justice
system.
I. THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF AGE AS A COMPONENT FOR
SENTENCING DETERMINATIONS
The origins of the juvenile justice system underscore the importance of a
youth’s age and presumed immaturity.31 However, this began to shift during
the late twentieth century when juvenile crime rates began to increase and
the “superpredator” theory of youth crime became widespread.32 This led
state legislatures to react, in part, by abandoning the emphasis on a youth’s
age and instead implementing various juvenile transfer mechanisms to
routinely try more youths in the traditional criminal justice system.33 As the
importance of age as a mitigating factor began to deteriorate in punishment
theory, youths were consequently held in, or sentenced to, adult facilities on
a more frequent basis.34 However, after the decisive Supreme Court holdings
in Roper v. Simmons,35 Graham v. Florida,36 and Miller v. Alabama,37 which
revamped the legal understanding of youth development, courts once again

29. Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205, 132 Stat. 5123, 5136 (2018).
30. See D’lorah L. Hughes, An Overview of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act and the Valid Court Order Exception, 2011 ARK. L. NOTES 29, 29.
31. See Green, supra note 13, at 242–43.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Key Facts, supra note 14, at 4–5.
35. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
36. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
37. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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view age as a mitigating factor at common law within both the juvenile and
criminal justice systems.
This Part explores the ebb and flow of the application of age in the juvenile
and criminal justice systems. Part I.A examines the original ideology upon
which the juvenile justice system was premised and how the importance of
individualized sentencing and rehabilitation was paramount to its success.
Part I.B analyzes the shifting perception of age within the political and legal
sectors due to the “superpredator” rhetoric of the late twentieth century and
how this led to a dramatic upsurge in the usage and availability of transfer
mechanisms that placed more juveniles into the criminal justice system. Part
I.C then explains how three landmark Supreme Court decisions declared that
age should be viewed as a mitigating factor in youth sentencing
determinations once again.
A. The Origins: Separation of the Juvenile Justice System and the
Criminal Justice System
During the late nineteenth century, the juvenile justice system38 developed
out of the notion that it was imperative to separate juveniles in delinquency
proceedings from adults subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal justice
system.39 The juvenile justice system was established during the Progressive
Era, when the political dialogue surrounding juvenile reform shifted focus
from imposing adult punishment on delinquent youths to rehabilitating such
youths.40 This reformative drive stemmed from the public’s discontent with
the criminal justice system, which, at the time, charged and punished youths
in the same manner as it did adults.41 In 1899, Illinois established the first
state system of juvenile courts and granted these courts jurisdiction over
“cases of dependency, neglect, and delinquency.”42 By 1945, all fifty states
38. When discussing the juvenile justice system, this Note will primarily refer to
delinquency cases. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)
defines delinquency as “[a]n act committed by a juvenile that would be criminal if committed
by an adult.” See Glossary, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/grantees/pm/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/J82R-7DZJ] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019). Delinquent acts include crimes committed against individuals and property,
drug offenses, and “crimes against public order.” Id. The juvenile justice system has
jurisdiction over all delinquency proceedings. Id. On the other hand, this Note discusses the
criminal justice system as it relates to youth when the youth in question is in a criminal
proceeding as opposed to in a delinquency proceeding. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE
MANUAL FOR MONITORING FACILITIES UNDER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION ACT OF 2002, at 17 (2010), https://cyfd.org/docs/OJJPD_Guidance_
Manual_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2C3-24NG].
39. See Green, supra note 13, at 239.
40. See Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the Promise of
Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259,
265 (1999) (The juvenile court’s main role was “‘to determine what course of treatment was
necessary [and most viable] to rehabilitate the juvenile’ offender.” This indicates that the
court’s core functions were “clinical” as opposed to “punitive.” (quoting Marygold S. Melli,
Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375, 378)).
41. See id. at 264; see also William W. Booth, History and Philosophy of the Juvenile
Court, in 1 FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.3 (15th ed. 2018).
42. Booth, supra note 41, § 1.3.
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had mandated “juvenile court legislation.”43 Judges in the juvenile justice
system were expected to handle youth cases differently than criminal court
judges handled adult cases by playing a parental role and acting without a
punitive mindset during adjudication.44 As such, juvenile judges primarily
focused on ensuring individualized attention to each youth offender’s
personal interests when formulating an adequate punishment for the youth’s
offense.45 Having judges take on this parental role highlighted the important
limitations that the juvenile justice system assigned to a youth’s culpability
level, which centered around how a youth’s age was perceived46: the system
saw delinquent youths as capable of reform due to the qualities associated
with adolescence.47
B. A Dramatic Shift in the Perception of Age: The “Superpredator” Era
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the public came to view the
specialized approach to youth punishment as burdensome due to the upswing
in crimes committed by youths.48 Between 1984 and 1994, the “arrest rates
for juveniles charged with violent offenses jumped 78 percent.”49 As a result,
the influx of youths passing through the juvenile justice system overburdened
judges, leading them to capriciously adjudicate cases.50 Ultimately, the
specialized, rehabilitative view of youth crime and the perception of age as
an indication of reform fell by the wayside.51 This change created parity
between adult and juvenile sentencing, mooting the founding goals of the
juvenile justice system, as youths were “arbitrarily punished” instead of
being provided with opportunities for reform.52

43. Id.
44. See Green, supra note 13, at 240–41.
45. See Smallheer, supra note 40, at 266. This individualized focus had roots in the
English common law parens patriae method, where the judge’s obligation to a child was to
provide “personalized justice” to cater to the child’s best interest. See Green, supra note 13,
at 239–40; see also William Hannan, Judicial Waiver as the Only Equitable Method to
Transfer Juvenile Offenders to Criminal Court, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
193, 197 (2008).
46. See Green, supra note 13, at 240–41.
47. See id. at 241.
48. See id. at 242; see also Smallheer, supra note 40, at 266 (explaining that the juvenile
justice system “moved toward aggregate treatment as it became over-burdened by growing
numbers of juvenile offenders”). However, the reasoning behind this upsurge in youth crime
is not clear-cut. See BUTTS & TRAVIS, supra note 11, at 1 (indicating that it is still up for debate
why “violent crime in the United States increased sharply in the 1980s and early 1990s before
dropping just as precipitously in the mid-to-late-1990s”).
49. JILL WOLFSON, COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, CHILDHOOD ON TRIAL: THE FAILURE OF
TRYING & SENTENCING YOUTH IN ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 7–8 (2005), https://
www.issuelab.org/resources/613/613.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X3Z-NQ38].
50. See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should
Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 47 (2013).
51. See id.
52. See Smallheer, supra note 40, at 267. This arbitrariness also led to a greater focus on
procedural issues within the juvenile justice system, including juvenile waiver proceedings.
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
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Media attention exacerbated the juridical reaction to increasing youth
crime in the 1980s and 1990s.53 The rhetoric surrounding the increase in
youth crime alarmed the public and certain political scholars promoting
theories that youth crime would turn America into a “ticking crime bomb.”54
The speculation that youths were committing heinous crimes became
widespread during the Clinton administration, and William J. Bennett, John
J. DiIulio, Jr., and John P. Waters’s coining of the phrase “superpredator”55
in their book Body Count reinforced this political concern.56 The authors
depicted delinquent youths as lacking any semblance of human decency,
describing them as “radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters . . .
who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting
gangs, and create serious communal disorders.”57 The authors claimed that
these youth superpredators “d[id] not fear the stigma of arrest, the pains of
imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience.”58 The authors virtually
dehumanized an entire generation of youth and the media picked up on their
superpredator rhetoric.59
The superpredator theory evolved well beyond a social concept—it
became entangled with the legal system as apprehensive politicians bought
into the rhetoric in the 1990s.60 State legislatures began ignoring the age of
majority61 in the criminal justice system and swiftly began to increase the
legal outlets for transferring youths from the juvenile justice system to the
criminal justice system.62 The superpredator theory played a considerable
53. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime
Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 538–39 (2013) (describing the coverage and reaction to
youth crime in the early 1990s as a “moral panic,” where the “media, politicians, and the
public interact[ed] in a pattern of escalating alarm in response to a perceived social threat.”).
54. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WATERS, BODY COUNT: MORAL
POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 21 (1996).
55. While the superpredator theory also has an ingrained racial component to it, this Note
solely focuses on its applicability to the youth population in general. See Clyde Haberman,
When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threatof-90s.html [https://perma.cc/AJ2A-SG43].
56. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 54, at 27.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Scott, supra note 53, at 539 (explaining that the superpredator “stereotype” was
used by both the media and politicians alike). See generally Richard Zoglin, Now for the Bad
News: A Teenage Time Bomb, TIME (Jan. 15, 1996), http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,983959,00.html [https://perma.cc/C2FP-6WTT].
60. See Scott, supra note 53, at 538–39 (“Prosecutors and politicians, eager to demonstrate
their concern for victims and for public safety, promised punishment of offenders and
protection from young criminals generally.”).
61. See Jurisdictional Boundaries, supra note 11 (defining the “upper age of jurisdiction”
as “the oldest age at which a juvenile court has original jurisdiction over an individual for law
violating behavior”).
62. See Marcy Mistrett & Jeree Thomas, A Campaign Approach to Challenge the
Prosecution of Youth as Adults, 62 S.D. L. REV. 559, 559 (2017) (explaining that almost every
state passed new transfer laws that simplified the process of “exclud[ing] youth from the
juvenile system,” which made it easier to “prosecute them in the adult criminal justice
system”).

800

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

role in the “dismantling of transfer restrictions . . . and it threw thousands of
children into an ill-suited and excessive punishment regime.”63 States grew
more lenient in transferring cases from the juvenile system to reduce the
political pressure on their courts that stemmed from the growing concern
about an influx of youth offenders who were incapable of reform.64
State legislatures came up with an abundance of transfer methods that
eventually led to an increase of youth incarceration in adult facilities across
the country.65 Regardless of a state’s age of majority,66 by 2011 all fifty
states had implemented transfer laws that adjusted the “usual jurisdictional
age boundaries” for some cases of youth delinquency by removing youths
from delinquency jurisdiction and placing them under the jurisdiction of the
criminal justice system.67 Transferring youths who had committed the most
heinous crimes to adult courts has always been an available option, but the
increase in youth arrest rates, coupled with the superpredator theory, led to a
sweeping increase in state waiver and transfer statutes.68
Much is at stake when transferring a youth into the criminal justice system.
Not only is the youth eligible to be cellmates with an adult who is possibly
twice or even triple his or her age, but the youth is also more likely to end up
incarcerated after being tried and processed in the adult criminal justice
system rather than through the juvenile justice system.69 This Note briefly
analyzes three main types of transfer mechanisms used in the United States
to demonstrate both the increased prevalence of transfer and the mass
expansion of ways a youth can end up in the criminal justice system.70
63. The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 2014),
https://eji.org/news/superpredator-myth-20-years-later [https://perma.cc/S63C-UZN9].
64. Hoeffel, supra note 50, at 36.
65. See WOLFSON, supra note 49, at 5 (“[I]nstead of celebrating a court that endeavors to
protect our communities by rehabilitating youth, a wave of legislative change has threatened
to dismantle it.”).
66. Although eighteen is typically thought of as the age where “childhood ends and adult
criminal responsibility begins,” this is not true for all states. In 2007, fourteen states
automatically excluded youths ages sixteen and seventeen from juvenile court jurisdiction.
ARYA, supra note 13, at 39. However, as of 2017, only four states continue to automatically
exclude seventeen-year-old youths from juvenile court jurisdiction: Texas, Georgia,
Michigan, and Wisconsin. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 2 (2011), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY49-Q8BA].
67. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 2.
68. See WOLFSON, supra note 49, at 13 (explaining that when a juvenile court judge is
deciding whether to transfer youths into adult courts, he or she “takes many complex,
interwoven issues into consideration” such as age, criminal record, maturity, seriousness of
offense, and risk to the public).
69. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 24 (demonstrating that, when comparing
data on juveniles from 1990, 1992, and 1994, the National Judicial Reporting Program found
that 68 percent of transferred youths received a sentence including incarceration and only 40
percent of youths who were not transferred into the criminal justice system received a sentence
including time in a juvenile correctional facility).
70. See Terry A. Maroney, Essay, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 787 (2011) (explaining that transfer mechanisms are essentially
solidified in the U.S. criminal justice system and acknowledging the court’s “evident comfort
level” with its usage, even for youths who are “very young”).
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The first transfer method is judicial waiver, where a presiding judge has
the discretion to decline jurisdiction in juvenile court for a youth.71 The
judge has broad leeway during the decision-making process, and state
statutes provide a wide range of guidance to determine if a youth should be
transferred.72 The judge will typically “weigh the interests of the child
against the interests of society” to reach what he or she deems the appropriate
conclusion.73 Approximately 7500 cases are judicially waived to criminal
court each year.74 As of 2018, forty-six states and the District of Columbia
use judicial transfers to remove youths to the adult court system.75
The second transfer mechanism is prosecutorial waiver, also called “direct
file,” wherein the prosecutor has the authority to determine whether a
particular case will initially be brought in juvenile court or criminal court.76
Because the procedures laid out in Kent v. United States77 are not binding on
prosecutors, they retain a considerable amount of discretion in these cases.78
As of 2018, thirteen states and the District of Columbia use prosecutorial
discretion as a transfer mechanism.79
The third transfer mechanism is legislative exclusion, where “a legislature
is free to limit juvenile court jurisdiction by completely removing some
offenders who would otherwise be classified as juveniles from that
jurisdiction.”80 Consequently, many youths are mandatorily excluded by
statute from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction for certain offenses, as Kirk

71. See Hannan, supra note 45, at 203.
72. See ARYA, supra note 5, at 16; see also Hannan, supra note 45, at 203. As transfer
and punishment-focused justice became more prevalent, the Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States laid out “condition[s] to a valid waiver order,” in order to remain within the
constitutional bounds of due process, which include entitlement “to a hearing, including access
by [petitioner’s] counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports . . . and to a
statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.” 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
73. See Hannan, supra note 45, at 203; Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy
the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 371, 379 (1998) (explaining that a significant number of states have adopted
the Kent criteria for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction into their statutes, sometimes verbatim).
74. See WOLFSON, supra note 49, at 8.
75. ARYA, supra note 13, at 12; see JEREE THOMAS, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE,
RAISING THE BAR: STATE TRENDS IN KEEPING YOUTH OUT OF ADULT COURTS (2015–2017) 41
(2017),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/StateTrends_Repot_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TY5-B853].
76. See WOLFSON, supra note 49, at 14–15.
77. 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
78. See id.; see also WOLFSON, supra note 49, at 15.
79. ARYA, supra note 13, at 12. The states include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming. For an extended argument on why prosecutorial waiver “does not serve justice,”
see Stacey Sabo, Note, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2446 (1996).
80. See Klein, supra note 73, at 390.
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Gunderson was.81 As of 2018, twenty-eight states use statutory exclusion as
a transfer mechanism.82
The increased ease of transfer has fallen short of achieving the deterrent
effect sought by state legislatures. In a 2005 Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) study of young offenders, where half of the
subjects were transferred to adult court and the other half remained under
juvenile jurisdiction, the study found that 49 percent of the transferred youths
recidivated compared to 35 percent of youths who remained within the
juvenile system.83 Additionally, although transfer was seemingly created to
waive jurisdiction for youths who commit the most serious offenses, research
indicates that a significant number of transferred youths are charged with
“nonviolent property and drug offenses,” indicating that transfer is not solely
administered for the worst youth offenders.84
Transfer mechanisms increased the number of youths removed from
juvenile court jurisdiction. At the same time, the political zeitgeist
surrounding the superpredator theory simultaneously decreased the
importance of a youth’s age as a rationale for relief from the adult criminal
justice system. However, the inevitable rise in crime predicted by the authors
of Body Count never occurred.85 The authors themselves later discredited
and regretted their idea that youths were superpredators.86 Juvenile crime
had peaked around the time that Body Count was published;87 in 1994, the
violent crimes index reached 497.4 arrests per 100,000 persons between the
ages of ten and seventeen.88 By 2012, the juvenile arrest rate was at a historic
low, coming in at 182.4 arrests per 100,000 persons between the ages of ten

81. See id. (explaining that the factors considered for legislative exclusion may vary by
state, but many include the youth’s “age, crime committed, past record, or some combination
of these three”).
82. ARYA, supra note 13, at 12; see also Klein, supra note 73, at 390 (“The effect of
statutory exclusion is that many more children who would otherwise remain in juvenile court
will automatically be transferred to criminal court with no Kent hearing and with the only
basis for the decision an impersonal, generalized offense-based criteria.”).
83. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO
DELINQUENCY? 5 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S8UY-SE7X].
84. See infra Part III.D.3; see also Randall T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Waiver to Adult
Criminal Courts, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381, 383 (2011).
85. See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theoriston-young-superpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html [https://perma.cc/F25K-827D].
86. See id. (explaining that DiIulio stated that he “wished he had never become the 1990’s
intellectual pillar for putting violent juveniles in prison and condemning them as
‘superpredators’”).
87. See ALBA MORALES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRANDED FOR LIFE: FLORIDA’S
PROSECUTION OF CHILDREN AS ADULTS UNDER ITS “DIRECT FILE” STATUTE 15 (2014), https://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0414_ForUpload%202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
EA7B-G9DK].
88. See Juvenile Arrest Rate Trends, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Oct. 22,
2018),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201
[https://
perma.cc/63FP-BCVA]; see also MORALES, supra note 87, at 15.
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and seventeen.89 Further, there was a roughly 50 percent drop in the number
of youths held in juvenile residential placements from 1999 to 2013.90 It
became clear that the superpredator rhetoric was “unduly alarmist” and a
critically inaccurate representation of the youth population.91
Though the superpredator theory has been discredited, its effects are still
prevalent in juvenile policy. Human Rights Watch has directly cited the
superpredator hysteria as a predominant reason for the expansion of transfer
statutes.92 While there has been “some softening” of transfer statutes in the
post-superpredator era, many transfer laws are still intact across the United
States.93 Consequently, the meanings of age and youthfulness in the criminal
justice system have been fundamentally shifted—the “focus on doing what
was best for the child was practically abandoned, while a new philosophy of
getting tough on juvenile offenders and protecting society was adopted.”94
C. The Use of Age as a Mitigating Factor: Roper, Miller, and Graham,
and the Importance of Empirical Data Relating to the Cognitive
Development of Youths
The “superpredator” rhetoric led to an increase in the use of transfer
mechanisms that placed youths in a criminal justice system meant for adults,
but the legal momentum again shifted at the end of the superpredator era.
Beginning in 2005, the Supreme Court decided three cases that restored the
view of age as a mitigating factor.
The first of these cases was Roper v. Simmons,95 which eliminated the
death penalty for those under eighteen years old.96 Roper explicitly listed
three pivotal differences between youths under eighteen and adults that show
why youths “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders.”97 First, in the majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy
referred to “scientific and sociological studies” that concluded that a “lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” are more often
found to be youthful traits that frequently lead to audacious decisionmaking.98 Second, Justice Kennedy noted that youths are more susceptible
to “negative influences and outside pressures” and therefore “lack the
freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic

15.

89. See Juvenile Arrest Rate Trends, supra note 88; see also MORALES, supra note 87, at

90. See ARYA, supra note 13, at 17.
91. See Becker, supra note 86.
92. See MORALES, supra note 87, at 2 (stating that Florida’s prosecutorial waiver law is a
“remnant” of the superpredator era).
93. See id. at 16. However, some states have made significant efforts over the last few
years to decrease the use of the more critically questioned forms of waiver, like direct file.
For example, in 2016, Vermont passed a bill to put a stop to direct file, making it the first state
to “roll back prosecutorial power.” See THOMAS, supra note 75, at 37.
94. See Hannan, supra note 45, at 201.
95. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
96. See id. at 567.
97. Id. at 569.
98. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
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setting.”99 Third, a youth’s character is less formulated than an adult’s,
lending to the conclusion that his or her conduct is “not as morally
reprehensible” as an adult’s.100 As a result of these findings, the Supreme
Court solidified the “relevance of youth as a mitigating factor” in punishment
theory, and further addressed the potential counterargument that “youth” has
an arbitrary cutoff age of eighteen within the criminal justice system.101
In 2010, Graham v. Florida102 continued the Supreme Court’s recognition
of the important traits associated with adolescence in juvenile sentencing.
Graham eliminated sentences of life without parole for youths in
nonhomicide cases.103 Again writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
partly relied on advances in psychological development to differentiate
youths from adults.104 He cited a study by the American Medical Association
that reported that “parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to
mature through late adolescence” and that this contributes to the innate
differences between youth and adult criminal activity.105
Finally, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama106 in 2012, the third
groundbreaking case in the series that definitively stated that youth are
intrinsically different than adults in the eyes of the judicial system.107 In
Miller, a fourteen-year-old boy was charged with capital murder, transferred
into criminal court, and sentenced to life without parole.108 The Court
eliminated the possibility of giving a youth a mandatory life sentence without
the possibility of parole as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.109 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kagan emphasized how the legal interpretation of
age has transformed, so that cases involving youths and life without parole
are decided based on “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”110 Even DiIulio himself signed and
endorsed an amicus brief for the case in favor of Miller.111 As a result of the
Court’s holding in Miller, youths are now deemed constitutionally distinct
from adults due to the mental and emotional attributes of youthfulness.112
99. Id. (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
100. Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
101. Id. Justice Kennedy stated that the “qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do
not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed,
however, a line must be drawn.” Id. at 574.
102. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
103. See id. at 70–71.
104. See id. at 68.
105. Id.
106. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
107. See Stephanie Tabashneck, “Raise the Age” Legislation: Developmentally Tailored
Justice, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2018, at 13, 17–18.
108. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465–66.
109. Id. at 469–70; see also MORALES, supra note 87, at 15.
110. Miller, 567 U.S. at 469–70 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
111. See generally Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10–9646), 2012 WL 174240.
112. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
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Instead of perceiving age as a simple number in the criminal justice system,
youthfulness is now associated with “immaturity” and “recklessness.”113
Empirical research has comprehensively supported the Court’s holdings in
Roper, Graham, and Miller.114 Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that
youth are substantially different from adults because of “structural
differences” in the brain.115 Research indicates that youthfulness makes an
individual more susceptible to making bad decisions, and as a youth grows
older and into his or her twenties, the “risk of faulty decision making
decreases.”116 Important psychological differences also exist between youth
and adults that likely have an impact on the youth’s ability to make rational
judgments.117 Delinquent behavior is typically “transitory,” and most youths
who commit crimes before eighteen do not go on to be criminals once they
are adults.118 In addition to psychological and structural differences in the
brain, the cognitive differences between youths and adults may also be
attributed to “psychosocial immaturity,” which can have a significant impact
on a youth’s ability to think about the outcomes of his or her decisions.119
Though recent Supreme Court decisions and accompanying scientific data
have allowed the judicial branch to move towards reestablishing the
importance of a youth’s age as a mitigating factor, many statutes, including
the JJDPA,120 continue to reflect outdated modes of thinking. Although the
law protects youths tried as adults as of December 2018 more extensively
under sight and sound separation, a youth may still be judicially waived from
the protection “in the interest of justice,”121 despite numerous studies
delineating the significant mental and emotional differences between a youth
and an adult. This new iteration of the JJDPA thus reflects the

113. Id. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)); see also Johnson v.
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993) (explaining that adolescence is a period of life “when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage”); Richard E. Redding,
Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based on Social Science
Research, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 709, 724 (“Research in the areas of decision making,
psychosocial development, and sociological influences is relevant to the issue of whether
adolescents are as culpable as adults for their crimes.”).
114. See Hoeffel, supra note 50, at 40 (“Copious, peer-reviewed scientific research, some
of which has recently been emphasized and relied upon by the Supreme Court, has established
developmental differences in adolescents that greatly impact their culpability, [and] their
susceptibility for deterrence.”). For examples of studies on which the Supreme Court relied,
see generally Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003). See also Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence:
A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992).
115. See Tabashneck, supra note 107, at 17.
116. Id. at 16.
117. See Redding, supra note 113, at 728.
118. See id. at 729.
119. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 114, at 1012 (stating that the “psychosocial factors
that are most relevant to understanding differences in judgment and decision making are (a)
susceptibility to peer influence, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) future
orientation, and (d) the capacity for self-management”).
120. See infra Part II.B.
121. Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205, 132 Stat. 5123, 5135 (2018).
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inconsistencies between the judicial and legislative branches in how age is
considered and applied in the criminal justice system.122
II. SIGHT AND SOUND SEPARATION: AN EFFORT TO REDUCE YOUTH
INCARCERATION WITH ADULTS
Since its enactment in 1974, the JJDPA has made strides in advancing the
protection of incarcerated youth in the United States. However, this Note
argues that there are still steps that need to be taken to fully realize the
JJDPA’s goals.123 Part II.A analyzes the JJDPA in general, and discusses
how state compliance with the statute’s provisions is paramount to the
successful implementation of the Act. Part II.B then discusses sight and
sound separation and its current implementation across the United States
after the JJDPA’s 2018 reauthorization.
A. An Overview of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
As more youths were incarcerated in the United States, the physical and
emotional integrity of such youths became an important aspect of prison
reform. This catalyzed the JJDPA’s enactment in 1974.124 Congress passed
the JJDPA to address the disparities between state systems with respect to
incarcerating youths and to further “support local and state efforts to prevent
delinquency and improve the juvenile justice system.”125 This legislation is
“the only federal law that sets out national standards for the custody and care
of youth in the juvenile justice system.”126 With the complex variations in
state laws regarding whether a youth may be placed in an adult facility, the
JJDPA’s core protections become even more imperative to the criminal
justice system.127 Though state adherence to the JJDPA is voluntary, the Act
creates a partnership between states and the federal government to enhance
the regulation of youth offenders.128 Even though the JJDPA expired in
2008,129 its importance to states is displayed by the fact that, despite the
expiration, Congress still administered appropriations for the JJDPA’s
provisions every year since the expiration.130
122. See generally Tabashneck, supra note 107.
123. See Hughes, supra note 30, at 29.
124. See Legislation/JJDP Act, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://
www.ojjdp.gov/about/legislation.html [https://perma.cc/QQ43-LVT4] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019).
125. See id.
126. Fact Sheet, supra note 21, at 1.
127. See ARYA, supra note 13, at 11. For example, four states explicitly ban the practice
of placing youths prosecuted as adults in adult jails. However, twelve states have state laws
that require youths, under certain circumstances, to be placed in adult facilities. Id.
128. See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, A PIVOTAL MOMENT: SUSTAINING THE SUCCESS AND
ENHANCING THE FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT 12
(2009), https://juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/resource_265.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/7ZRA-FZBN].
129. See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22655, JUVENILE JUSTICE FUNDING
TRENDS 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22655.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8PV-K9YF].
130. See id.
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Congress reauthorized the JJDPA in 2002 and did not reauthorize it again
for sixteen years.131 In 2018, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice Reform
Act of 2018.132 The bill passed with “overwhelming bipartisan support” and
implemented strengthened core requirements for state facilities to adhere to
over the course of the next three years.133
Since the United States has no national juvenile justice system and only
independently run state and local systems,134 the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) was formed within the Department of
Justice to create a more unified system of standards and to allocate funds to
state systems via federal grants for JJDPA programs.135 For states to receive
such funding from the OJJDP,136 they must satisfy the “four core
protections” set out in the JJDPA, one being sight and sound separation.137
The purpose of the four core protections is to “ensure appropriate, safe and
rehabilitative treatment” for incarcerated youth.138 If a state is not compliant
with the each of the JJDPA’s four core protections, the state’s allocation of
funds is reduced by 20 percent for each protection it fails to implement.139
In 2008, the Coalition for Juvenile Justice administered a survey
identifying each state’s compliance standards for the JJDPA’s core
protections, and the results revealed that “55 of 56 states and territories
voluntarily participate[d]” in the JJDPA’s core protection programs.140
Additionally, 85 percent of respondents were in compliance with the four
core protections set out by the JJDPA and received full federal funding.141
Thus, while it is still voluntary to comply with the JJDPA, and therefore with
sight and sound separation, an overwhelming majority of states are
131. See Legislation/JJDP Act, supra note 124.
132. See Lacey Johnson, JJDPA Reauthorization Passes Congress After 16 Years, JUV.
JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Dec. 13, 2018), https://jjie.org/2018/12/13/jjdpa-reauthorizationpasses-congress-after-16-years [https://perma.cc/78L2-GN79]; see also JJDPA Reauthorized
After 16 Years, Preserving Core Protections for Youth, PAC. JUV. DEFENDER CTR. (Jan. 1,
2019), https://www.pjdc.org/jjdpa-reauthorized-after-16-years-preserving-core-protectionsfor-youth [https://perma.cc/KG2J-HKD3] [hereinafter JJDPA Reauthorized].
133. See Overview of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, ACT 4 JUV. JUST. (Dec.
2018), http://www.act4jj.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/JJDPA%20Reauthorization%
20Summary%20December%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5Z4-9GA5].
134. See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 128, at 17; see also FINKLEA, supra note
129, at 1.
135. See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 128, at 13.
136. See FINKLEA, supra note 129, at 1 (“Funds are allocated annually among the states on
the basis of relative population of people under the age of 18, and states must adhere to certain
core mandates in order to be eligible for funding.”).
137. See infra Part II.B. Only sight and sound separation will be analyzed in this Note.
See History of the JJDPA, COALITION FOR JUV. JUST., http://www.juvjustice.org/federalpolicy/juvenile-justice-and-delinquency-prevention-act [https://perma.cc/V73S-F3MA] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019); see also COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 128, at 12 (“In support
of these efforts, OJJDP provides oversight, technical assistance and other supports to the field,
and advances research and evaluation initiatives to identify and replicate best practices in
juvenile justice and delinquency prevention.”).
138. See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 128, at 17.
139. See Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205, 132 Stat. 5123, 5139 (2018).
140. See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 128, at 12.
141. See id. at 12–13.
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consistently compliant and receive the full amount of funding to implement
the statutory protections provided to incarcerated youth.
B. Sight and Sound Separation: A Core Protection
After sixteen years of juvenile justice advocates working to curtail
Congress’s “outmoded perceptions” of impactful protections for delinquent
youth, Congress finally reauthorized the JJDPA, and thus sight and sound
separation, in December 2018.142 For purposes of the statute, sight and sound
means “any physical, clear visual, or verbal contact that is not brief and
inadvertent” with an adult incarcerated person, including incarcerated adult
trustees.143 Sight and sound separation is now applicable, albeit in different
ways, to two groups of youths. First, the JJDPA demands sight and sound
separation between youths and adults when youths prosecuted in juvenile
court are sanctioned to be placed in an adult facility for the purpose of being
processed, waiting for transfer to a juvenile facility, or awaiting a court
appearance—or when a youth falls under the “rural exception” and can be in
an adult facility until subsequent transport to a juvenile facility is feasible.144
This sector of youths account for approximately 20 percent of all youths held
in adult facilities.145 Second, sight and sound separation now applies to
youths who are tried as adults in the criminal justice system, although the law
does not afford them the same blanket protection from sight and sound
contact with adults provided to their juvenile counterparts under juvenile
court jurisdiction.146 This population of incarcerated youths accounts for
approximately 80 percent of youths held in adult facilities.147
Throughout the United States, many adult facilities have “impermissible
contacts” between youths and adults that transpire during admissions
procedures, meal times, and more.148 The JJDPA aims to eliminate such
contacts.149 The OJJDP has advised that sight and sound separation must be
“accomplished architecturally or through policies and procedures in all
secure areas of the facility which include, but are not limited to, such areas
as admissions, sleeping, and shower and toilet areas.”150 Many states adhere
to the sight and sound separation provision and have codified the
protection.151 As of 2014, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia
142. See JJDPA Reauthorized, supra note 132.
143. § 205, 132 Stat. at 5124; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 11.
144. See 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(13) (Supp. 2017); see also ARYA, supra note 13, at 11.
145. See ARYA, supra note 13, at 11.
146. See 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11)(B)(i) (Supp. 2017).
147. See ARYA, supra note 13, at 11.
148. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 14.
149. See id.
150. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303 (2019); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 16; Status
Offenders, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION 1 (Sept. 2015), https://www.ojjdp.gov/
mpg/litreviews/Status_Offenders.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CGK-MBGL] (explaining that the
OJJDP defines a status offense as “a noncriminal act that is considered a law violation only
because of a youth’s status as a minor”).
151. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8–305(B) (2019) (“A juvenile who is confined in a
jail or lockup in which adults are confined shall be kept in a physically separate section from
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used language in their statutes to require sight and sound separation from
incarcerated adults for youths detained in adult facilities.152
The implementation of the 2018 amendments to the JJDPA will take place
over the next three years.153 All states are now required to provide sight and
sound separation for youths who are awaiting trial in the adult criminal
justice system, provided that a judge does not find against such protection.154
This remodeling of sight and sound protection will significantly protect more
incarcerated youths than ever before.
III. A FEDERAL LOOPHOLE: IS THE CURRENT APPLICATION OF SIGHT AND
SOUND SEPARATION LEAVING THE VERY YOUTHS IT SEEKS TO PROTECT
VULNERABLE AND EXPOSED?
Although the 2018 JJDPA reauthorization provides more security for
youths tried as adults within the criminal justice system, there are outstanding
exceptions that hinder the JJDPA’s progression towards suitable and
systemic protection for youths. More specifically, the amended sight and
sound separation section of the JJDPA now codifies the opportunity for a
court to deny sight and sound separation for a youth tried as an adult if it is
“in the interest of justice” to do so.155 This new “in the interest of justice”
loophole to sight and sound separation is a hindrance to the complete
protection of vulnerable youths in America’s prison system.
To that end, Part III.A examines the new language of the JJDPA and how
it has impacted youths awaiting trial within criminal courts across the
country.
Part III.B analyzes the relevant ramifications of the
underinclusiveness of sight and sound separation’s current application. Part
III.C explains how the 2018 amendment to sight and sound separation
protection creates a chasm between congressional and Supreme Court
interpretations of the ascribed meaning of a youth’s age in sentence-related
practices. Part III.D then outlines potential criticisms and possible reasons
why the statute continues to have an exception to an otherwise blanket
protection of youths tried as adults, despite the relevant data of youth abuse
within adult facilities.

any adult who is charged with or convicted of a criminal offense, and no sight or sound contact
between the juvenile and any charged or convicted adult is permitted, except to the extent
authorized under federal laws or regulations.”).
152. See JJDPA Core Requirements, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Apr. 27,
2015), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04306.asp?qaDate=2014 [https://
perma.cc/U8MG-9EZD] (stating that in addition, six states (Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have explicitly codified in their
statutes that youths are never allowed to be detained in an adult facility, thus making the
application of sight and sound separation unnecessary).
153. See supra note 20.
154. See Overview of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, supra note 133.
155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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A. Sight and Sound Separation’s Current Application
Before the 2018 JJDPA reauthorization, the OJJDP stated in its Guidance
Manual for Monitoring Facilities that “[a] juvenile who has been transferred
or waived or is otherwise under the jurisdiction of a criminal court does not
have to be separated from adult criminal offenders” with respect to JJDPA
compliance.156 However, after the 2018 reauthorization, the sight and sound
separation provision now reads that “juveniles awaiting trial or other legal
process who are treated as adults for purposes of prosecution in criminal
court and housed in a secure facility shall not have sight or sound contact
with adult inmates.”157 Though the new language is vastly more inclusive,
an exception to sight and sound separation remains to an otherwise
comprehensive statute for youths tried as adults. This exception gives a
presiding judge the discretion to determine where it is “in the interest of
justice” to allow a youth “to be held in any jail or lockup for adults, or have
sight or sound contact with adult inmates.”158
Upon deciding whether a youth should not be afforded sight and sound
separation protection, a judge may consider seven factors in his or her
decision: (1) the youth’s age; (2) the youth’s mental and physical maturity
level; (3) the youth’s current mental state, including consideration of whether
the youth “present[s] an imminent risk of harm” to themselves; (4) the
“nature and circumstances” of the offense for which the youth is being tried;
(5) the youth’s history of any previous delinquent behavior; (6) the “relative
ability of the available adult and juvenile detention facilities to not only meet
the specific needs of the juvenile, but also to protect the safety of the public
as well as other detained youth”; and (7) any other relevant factor.159 If the
presiding judge determines, after balancing these factors, that it is in fact “in
the interest of justice” to hold a youth in an adult facility, this is a statutorily
acceptable result.160 However, the judge must further hold a hearing at least
every thirty days161 in order to “review whether it is still in the interest of
justice” to allow the youth to have sight and sound contact with adults.162
Finally, the statute states that a youth cannot be held in an adult facility for
longer than 180 days unless the judge “determines there is good cause for an
extension” of such detainment.163
Therefore, when a judge determines that a youth, based on the seven
factors provided, should not be afforded sight and sound separation
protection, the state with jurisdiction over the matter is not in violation of the
JJDPA’s core requirement and will not lose federal funding. The outcome
of the new statute’s mandate is that an unascertained segment of the youth
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
See id.
162.
163.

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17.
Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205, 132 Stat. 5123, 5135 (2018).
Id. § 205, 132 Stat. at 5136.
Id.
Id.
For a “rural jurisdiction,” the statute indicates that every forty-five days is acceptable.
See id.
See id.
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population may be legally deprived of this critical JJDPA protection based
on judicial discretion.164 Instead, such youths, like incarcerated adults,
would only be shielded by the protections provided by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.165 This new “federal loophole”166 may thus leave
a portion of the youths that the JJDPA aims to protect vulnerable and exposed
to the dangers of adult facilities.
B. Relevant Repercussions of Sight and Sound Separation’s Current
Application
The sight and sound separation loophole will have a far-reaching impact,
as evidenced by statistics regarding youths who are held in adult facilities.167
One research study found that youths incarcerated in adult facilities are “19
times more likely to commit suicide in jail than youth[s] in the general
population and 36 times more likely to commit suicide in an adult jail than
in a juvenile detention facility.”168 Incidents of physical abuse are also
significantly higher for youths who are held in adult facilities. The OJJDP
has found that such juveniles are “twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and
50 percent more likely to be attacked with a weapon than their counterparts
in a juvenile facility.”169 Sexual victimization is another obstacle that youths
face when incarcerated with adults. In 2005, incarcerated individuals under
eighteen years old accounted for 21 percent of all reported victims of sexual
violence in jails, even though they only accounted for approximately 1
percent of the incarcerated population.170 Youths who are incarcerated with
adults are five times more likely to be victims of sexual assault than youths
in juvenile facilities.171 Of the youths who are sexually assaulted, 75 percent
reported “experiencing physical force or threat of force” and over 25 percent
of such victims “reported being injured in at least one of the incidents.”172
The impact goes even further than physical and emotional abuse, however.
Many of the youths who are housed with adults end up having their cases
dismissed or may even be transferred back to juvenile court jurisdiction.173

164. See Amanda M. Kellar, Note, They’re Just Kids: Does Incarcerating Juveniles with
Adults Violate the Eighth Amendment?, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 155, 169 (2006).
165. See id. For example, the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual
punishment applies to state jails and prisons through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679–80 (N.D. Cal. 1966)
(holding that a strip cell in California prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment, which
was applied to the state’s incarcerated adults through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
166. See ARYA, supra note 5, at 22.
167. See Fact Sheet, supra note 21, at 2.
168. Id.
169. See Juvenile Transfer to Criminal Court, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_j.html [https://perma.cc/S2L8-TMET] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019).
170. See ARYA, supra note 5, at 13.
171. See Juvenile Transfer to Criminal Court, supra note 169.
172. Fact Sheet, supra note 21, at 2.
173. ARYA, supra note 5, at 8.
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The effects of incarceration with adults, however, have a lasting impact on a
youth’s life once he or she is released.174
Thus, the new application of sight and sound separation can have serious
consequences for a youth. This is especially apparent when considering that,
in some cases, the determination of whether youths are waived into the adult
system can rely solely on differing state transfer statutes.175 This signals that
youths who are from different states but have committed the same crime
could be afforded different legal protections based on what the presiding
judge determines is in “the interest of justice.”176 In addition to different
transfer statutes, the age of majority is still not uniform across the United
States. This increases the disparate treatment of youths regarding sight and
sound separation. As of 2018, four states have limited juvenile court
jurisdiction to the age of seventeen.177 This means that, no matter how minor
the crime in question, seventeen-year-old youths in Georgia, Michigan,
Texas, and Wisconsin will be housed in adult facilities if convicted.178
Additionally, in twenty-eight states, a youth who is arrested for a “specified
offense” that is excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction will be
automatically placed in an adult facility when booked by law enforcement.179
Therefore, some youths, above the age of majority and charged with specific
offenses, will not receive sight and sound protection simply because of the
state their case is in.
C. Sight and Sound Separation’s Application Is Not Aligned with the
Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Implications of a Youth’s Age
Denying certain youths sight and sound separation protection based on a
judicial determination is not consistent with the current legal understanding
of the emotional, physical, and cognitive vulnerabilities of youths as
174. See, e.g., id. (providing a first-hand account of a youth’s experience while incarcerated
with adults, in which he indicates that “it was me against the world and out of necessity I was
transformed into a rough creature”).
175. See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 75, at 25–27 (demonstrating the differences between
many states’ transfer statutes and acknowledging that some states have been aiming to reform
their statutes to be more amenable to youths involved in the justice system).
176. See id.
177. See ARYA, supra note 13, at 39; see also Jurisdictional Boundaries, supra note 11
(defining juvenile as “a youth at or below the upper age of original jurisdiction in a State”).
However, statutory exclusion may still come into play and remove certain youths to adult
criminal court. See supra Part II.B.1.
178. See ARYA, supra note 13, at 39.
179. See id. (“This may be true even in States which have a reverse waiver statute or a state
jail law that allows a hearing for the child to return to juvenile court. The interaction between
the statutory exclusion law and state jail law can lead to some absurd scenarios where children
as young as 10 have been admitted to adult jails.”). When states began to statutorily implement
sight and sound separation, youths were frequently “deprived of constitutional liberties” in
order for states to remain compliant with the statute. See Kellar, supra note 164, at 168–69.
The facilities were forcing youths into isolation as an alternative to holding them in the same
area as adults. As a result, the JJDPA’s sight and sound separation protection was amended
in 1980 by the OJJDP, which asserted that youths may be held in adult prisons for the few
hours immediately preceding and following their court hearings in order for states to remain
compliant and to avoid solitary confinement during such times. See id.
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demonstrated in recent Supreme Court decisions.180 The Court altered the
way youthfulness should be viewed through a policy lens, and its conclusions
were reached in part through empirical research regarding youths’ cognitive
functioning.181 Not only are youths considered “constitutionally” different
in the eyes of the Court, but there are established “fundamental differences”
between youths and adults.182 Thus, if such findings regarding the
importance of age have led to significant transformations in common law that
protect all youths, the question remains as to why sight and sound separation,
a facet of postsentencing procedure, has not been modified to provide
unqualified protection to all youths in correctional facilities as well.
The Supreme Court made great strides in linking the up-to-date scientific
research on a youth’s cognitive and emotional development with procedural
components for youth sentencing. On the other hand, while Congress did
amend the JJDPA in 2018 in part to make an effort to subscribe to the
scientific research on youth development,183 they did not provide the same
all-encompassing procedural protections to youths that the Supreme Court
did. For instance, there are no statutory exceptions to the ban on the youth
death penalty or life without the possibility of parole sentencing
determinations.184 This is because of the knowledge our society now has
about the cognitive and psychological differences between youths and
adults.185
Regardless of whether a youth is tried in the juvenile or adult court system,
a youth still has the same scientific brain development patterns and
psychological capabilities.186 In Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy
discussed how even expert psychologists have a difficult time determining
the distinction between a “juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate
yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”187 Because of the innate difficulty in differentiating
between youths capable of reform and those who are past the point of
rehabilitation, it is not clear why Congress has not provided
“developmentally appropriate justice” in calling for unqualified protection
from sight and sound contact with incarcerated adults for all incarcerated
youths, like the Supreme Court held for certain sentencing determinations.188

180. See supra Part I.C.
181. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (declaring that advancements in
“psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile
and adult minds”).
182. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012).
183. See Overview of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, supra note 133.
184. See supra Part I.C.
185. See supra Part I.C.
186. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 476–77.
187. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
188. See Tabashneck, supra note 107, at 19.
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D. Plausible Challenges to Remodeling Sight and Sound Separation’s
Current Statutory Application
Despite the relevant youth victimization statistics and the Supreme Court’s
use of age for mitigating sentencing practices, there may be notable reasons
for why blanket sight and sound separation protection could pose challenges.
Before endorsing the removal of the sight and sound separation protection
exception in the 2018 amendment, this Note surveys the conceivable barriers
to implementing a blanket protection. Part III.D.1 analyzes some of the
potential increases in costs associated with sight and sound protection. Part
III.D.2 explores the structural hardships a facility may face when imposing
an expanded version of sight and sound separation. Part III.D.3 dissects the
theory that only the worst youth offenders are transferred to adult facilities
and therefore are befittingly denied sight and sound separation protection.
Part III.D.4 then discusses the potential for state noncompliance with the
JJDPA as a result of statutory expansion.
1. An Increased Fiscal Responsibility for Facilities
Cost is always at the forefront of arguments against a change in
government policy. Depending on the systems and structural capabilities a
facility already has in place,189 the range of associated costs could vary
significantly due to a statutory change. Therefore, it is infeasible to
accurately account for the increases in spending for the closure of the sight
and sound separation loophole. Nevertheless, there are ways around
significant increases in costs for implementing an expanded version of sight
and sound separation that may further the argument for statutory
redevelopment, some of which have been acknowledged within the statute
itself and by the OJJDP’s guidance manual.190
A natural result of implementing a heightened version of sight and sound
separation is the need to hire extra security officers within a facility to
implement the expansion.191 A 2015 study by the Vera Institute of Justice
found that a facility’s employment costs accounted for approximately 68
percent of a state prison’s spending, making employment expenditures from
a potential increase in security one of the most significant concerns when
considering a statutory expansion of the sight and sound separation.192
However, hiring more staff may not be necessary, as the JJDPA explicitly
states that there can be officers working in “collocated facilities,”193 so long

189.
190.
191.
192.

See infra Part III.D.2.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17.
See id. at 26.
See CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS:
EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 9 (2017), vera.org/downloads/
publications/the-price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VRE4BV9K].
193. The JJDPA defines collocated facilities as “facilities that are located in the same
building, or are part of a related complex of buildings located on the same grounds.” 34 U.S.C.
§ 11103(28) (Supp. 2017).
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as the officer has been “trained and certified to work with juveniles.”194 If
facilities are allowed to collocate common areas, it may be unnecessary to
increase the number of correctional officers, which will significantly reduce
the largest cost of statutory expansion.195 Instead, certifying or training
current employees would be the direct cost associated with a statutory
expansion and could cut the need for additional hiring within a facility.196
The OJJDP guidance manual also provides for significant reductions in
spending regarding architectural obstacles a facility may face for the
implementation of an expanded sight and sound separation protection.197
The sight and sound separation expansion would likely not cause any issues
for other expenditures, as recognized by the Vera Institute of Justice. Costs
such as health care, boarding payments, and the general “average cost per
inmate” would cause only a minor, if any, increase in a facility’s spending
with regard to a statutory expansion.198 Thus, the arguments that the
expansion of sight and sound protection will significantly increase costs of
facilities are overstated.
2. A Facility’s Structural Incapability and Separation
A significant obstacle that state legislatures face in expanding sight and
sound separation protection is that adult facilities may not be structurally
capable of completely separating adults and youths.199 However, the JJDPA
does not specify that youths and adults must be held in separate buildings—
youths simply cannot have sight and sound contact with adults.200
This Note explains that sight and sound separation can be implemented in
two distinct ways without having to change the physical layout of a
facility.201 First, separation can be completed through regulated time phasing
policies by facilities, which is a method recognized by the OJJDP guidance
manual.202 Time phasing refers to monitoring common areas shared by all
incarcerated individuals to eliminate concurrent use of such areas by youths
and adults.203 Thus, while a specific area of a facility could not be occupied
by youths and adults at the same time, there would be no need to build new
facilities or purchase new equipment, since any resources from the
communal spaces could be used by both groups of incarcerated persons at
194. Id. § 11133(a)(12)(B).
195. See MAI & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 192, at 9.
196. See
Corrections
Officer
Training,
CORRECTIONALOFFICEREDU.ORG,
https://www.correctionalofficeredu.org/training [https://perma.cc/FVT4-5AY2] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019) (explaining that correctional officers who work directly with youth offenders
must complete “training programs that emphasize juvenile psychology, family therapy and
social welfare”).
197. See infra Part III.D.2.
198. See MAI & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 192, at 7, 22.
199. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17.
200. See id. at 16.
201. Though there are certainly other ways to remain compliant with an updated sight and
sound protection, this Note only discusses two particular ways.
202. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 16.
203. See id.
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different times.204 Time phasing is implemented as a strategy for sight and
sound separation in various state facilities between adults and youths still
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system, including Florida.205
This lends credence to its likely success if it were to be implemented on a
larger scale to include youths transferred into the adult criminal justice
system as well.
A second method that can be used, as demonstrated in Massachusetts, is
the use of sound blocking products in lieu of unworkable architectural
changes to a facility.206 While Massachusetts has implemented the use of
sound-reducing curtains in order to eliminate sight and sound contact
between youths who are still under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice
system and adults, there are other products that could be used, such as sound
silencer panels and PVC barriers.207
Finally, some may also argue that juvenile facilities lack the necessary
space to house juveniles currently residing in adult facilities. However, data
indicates that there is substantial space within juvenile facilities in which to
incorporate the youth population currently housed in adult facilities.208 As
of 2013, states likely have enough beds and space to hold even a large inflow
of youths from adult facilities because of the nearly 50 percent decrease in
the number of youths housed in juvenile facilities since 1999.209
3. Youths Who Are Transferred to Adult Facilities Are the “Worst of the
Worst” Offenders and Therefore Should Be Treated Like Adults: A Theory
Those opposed to statutory expansion may argue that youths who are tried
in the adult criminal justice system are not entitled to the same uncontested
sight and sound separation protection as those who are tried in the juvenile
justice system, because the former are considered the “worst of the worst”

204. See DANA SWAYZE, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE FEDERAL JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT VS. MINNESOTA STATUTES AND RULES OF JUVENILE
PROCEDURE 46 (2010), https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/forms-documents/Documents/

JJDPA%20vs%20MN_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6B3-7RYB].
205. See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, FLORIDA GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR
MONITORING ADULT JAILS, LOCKUPS, AND COURT HOLDING FACILITIES UNDER THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (JJDPA) OF 2002, at 12 (2014), http://
www.djj.state.fl.us/docs/jjdp-performance-measurement/2014-jjdpa-jail-lockupmanual.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/HTN4-EXTA].
206. See MASS. JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., MASSACHUSETTS JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND STATE LEGISLATURE 9
(2014),
https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/724982/ocn1906260992014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/PBU7-T47T] (“Where renovations
have been deemed to be infeasible, several of the facilities have been identified for nonrenovation remedies such as the use of strategically-placed, sound-reducing curtains to
mitigate sight and sound contact between detainees in the facilities . . . .”).
207. See Soundproofing Correctional Facilities, ACOUSTICAL SURFACES, INC.,
https://www.acousticalsurfaces.com/correctional-facilities
[https://perma.cc/EK7Z-PE4P]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
208. See ARYA, supra note 13, at 17.
209. See supra Part I.B.
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offenders.210 Under this theory, these offenders do not deserve the
protections provided to other youths under the JJDPA and, thus, should not
have sight and sound protection while incarcerated.211
However, research indicates that not all youths who are transferred to the
criminal justice system have committed what society considers the worst
crimes.212 In fact, many such youths have been charged with nonviolent drug
offenses or property crimes, contradicting the notion that only the most
serious youth offenders are transferred into the criminal justice system.213 In
2007, the Department of Justice estimated that, of the 8500 cases judicially
waived214 to the criminal justice system, 27 percent of cases were property
offenses, 13 percent of cases were drug offenses, and 11 percent of cases
were “public order” offenses—none of which are crimes against persons.215
Some states even have statutory exclusion216 laws that completely exclude
“juvenile-age offenders” from being placed under the jurisdiction of the
respective juvenile court for “less serious offenses, especially where older
juveniles or those with serious delinquency histories are involved.”217 For
example, a Montana state law218 automatically excludes any seventeen-yearold accused of attempted burglary or attempted drug possession from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system.219 Mississippi state law excludes
any youth aged thirteen and older who commits an armed felony from
juvenile jurisdiction.220 With data indicating that transfer is not solely used
for the very worst youth offenders and that in some cases, it can be used for
youths significantly younger than seventeen, the theory that transferred
youths should be treated as adults with regards to sight and sound separation
during their incarceration loses credibility.
4. The Threat of State Noncompliance with the JJDPA
An indirect cost that facilities may face is that, with an increased demand
for sight and sound separation, there may be greater noncompliance with the
JJDPA than in the past. This would lead to noncompliant states receiving a
20 percent funding cut towards all four JJDPA core requirements.221
However, most states view the OJJDP as a “critical partner” in their efforts
210. See Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., Juvenile Transfers in Florida: The Worst of the
Worst?, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 280 (1999).
211. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17.
212. See Salekin et al., supra note 84, at 383.
213. See id.
214. This statistic does not include other transfer mechanisms discussed in Part I.B.
215. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 10.
216. See id. at 6 (“Murder is the offense most commonly singled out by statutory exclusion
laws. In Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New Mexico, exclusion laws apply only to accused
murderers. In all other states with exclusion statutes, murder is included along with other
serious or violent felonies.”)
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205, 132 Stat. 5123, 5139 (2018).
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to improve the juvenile justice system,222 and past deficits in state funding
for JJDPA protections have yet to significantly deter state adherence to the
Act.223 Between 2010 and 2015, the funding appropriated to the OJJDP to
fund such juvenile justice programs declined each year.224 In the 2016 fiscal
year, Congress’s funding of juvenile justice programs at $270.2 million was
at its highest level since 2005, though the budget was nearly $154 million
lower than in 2010.225
However, in 2016, the OJJDP reported that only six states received a
reduction in funding for noncompliance with the JJDPA’s core protections,
and, further, only three states received a funding reduction due to
noncompliance with sight and sound protection.226 In 2017, only one state
received a funding reduction due to noncompliance with sight and sound
protection.227 Despite the decrease in the JJDPA budget, there has not been
an outstanding issue with noncompliance.228 This may indicate that, if there
was a slight increase in implementation costs, this would not be enough to
drive state noncompliance.229
Each of the compliant states and territories have assembled a State
Advisory Group on Juvenile Justice composed of a minimum of fifteen
individuals whose role is to make sure the state remains compliant with the
JJDPA and to determine the most effective use of federal funds from the
OJJDP to reach such goals.230 Since the inception of the JJDPA in 1974,
there have been numerous amendments to the Act,231 and even though many
of the amendments have expanded the duties of the states, compliance has
not been a serious issue across the board. Therefore, an amendment to
expand sight and sound separation to all youths would likely have no effect
on state compliance with the JJDPA.
IV. SIGHT AND SOUND SEPARATION SHOULD BE STATUTORILY EXPANDED
TO INCLUDE EVERY YOUTH TRIED AS AN ADULT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM UNDER ITS SPHERE OF PROTECTION
Despite the advances made in juvenile justice sentencing practices by the
Supreme Court over the last fifteen years, the application of sight and sound
separation—a facet of sentencing—remains problematic. This leaves a
222. See supra Part II.A; see also COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 128, at 13.
223. See generally FINKLEA, supra note 129, at 1.
224. See id. at 3.
225. See id. at 4.
226. See id. at 3; see also State Compliance with JJPD Act Core Requirements, OFF. JUV.
JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/compliancedata.html
[https://perma.cc/9PXJ-XKLY] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (stating that the three states that
received a cut in funding were Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Wisconsin).
227. See State Compliance with JJPD Act Core Requirements, supra note 226 (stating that
the only state to receive a funding cut was Massachusetts).
228. See FINKLEA, supra note 129, at 1.
229. See generally COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 128.
230. See id. at 22.
231. See Legislation/JJDP Act, supra note 124 (indicating that changes have been made to
the JJDPA in 1977, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 2002, and 2018).
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complicated divide in how age is used as a factor for punishment in the
criminal justice system.232 To rectify the schism in the meaning ascribed to
age within the justice system, the JJDPA should broaden its sight and sound
separation protection to cover every youth who is tried and sentenced as an
adult in the criminal justice system, without opportunity for judicial
discretion.233
The rationale for applying sight and sound separation to youths who are
still under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system, such as the reduction
in sexual and physical violence by incarcerated adults, applies to youths who
are transferred and tried in the criminal justice system as well.234 The
placement of a youth within an adult facility with no sight and sound
protection based on the “interest of justice” can lead to youth victimization
by adult incarcerated persons, regardless of whether the youth is tried as a
juvenile or an adult. In the sentencing context, the difference between a
youth tried as an adult versus a juvenile is simply procedural. Therefore,
taking away blanket protection for all youths tried as adults leads to
inconsistent sentencing practices throughout the United States. For example,
under Mississippi state law, if a thirteen-year-old is charged with an armed
felony, the youth is automatically and procedurally under the jurisdiction of
the criminal justice system and could thus be judicially excluded from sight
and sound separation protection if it is found to be in the interest of justice to
do so.235 However, if a youth in a neighboring state committed the same
crime, he or she might be procedurally classified as a juvenile and therefore
automatically subject to sight and sound separation while incarcerated.236
The difference between the two crimes is simply applicable state law.
Instead, sight and sound separation should be applicable to all incarcerated
youths, regardless of how a youth is procedurally classified by state law.
The OJJDP has expressed that one of the primary goals of the JJDPA is to
protect youths “from inappropriate placements and from the harm—both
physical and psychological—that can occur as a result of exposure to adult
inmates.”237 But this objective should be expanded to the entire youth
community involved with the justice system. This would further the JJPDA’s
ultimate focus of improving the youth delinquency and justice systems. It
should not be left open to a judge to determine if it is “in the interest of
justice” for a youth to be afforded basic sight and sound separation protection
while incarcerated.238
Since the Supreme Court determined that youths are “constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing,”239 it is logical to extend
that rationale to postsentencing aspects of a youth’s safety while
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38.
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incarcerated. If Kirk Gunderson had been protected by sight and sound
separation as a seventeen-year-old while incarcerated, he would not have
faced physical and emotional abuse from incarcerated adults and his life may
have been spared.240 Kirk was considered an adult under Wisconsin law at
age seventeen and “drawing the line” at eighteen for more age-appropriate
incarceration practices would help to further eliminate youth abuse within
the criminal justice system.241 If eighteen is the cutoff that the Supreme
Court declared as the distinction between “childhood and adulthood” for
criminal procedure purposes, then the same rationale should apply for sight
and sound separation, a procedure that occurs after sentencing
determinations.242
The physical and emotional abuse a youth faces when incarcerated with
adults can occur no matter how a youth is defined by law.243 If anything, it
is worse for those youths who are tried as adults and afforded no sight and
sound protection, as empirical research demonstrates that youths held in adult
facilities have an increased chance of suicide, sexual victimization,
recidivism, and physical assault compared to those youths incarcerated in
juvenile facilities.244 The dangers a youth faces while in an adult facility
forces many to succumb to a criminal lifestyle in order to protect themselves
while incarcerated.245 Violence typically becomes the ordinary way of life,
as youths learn from adults that this is the best mode of survival and way to
fit in.246 However, this lifestyle, and the youth victimization that is usually
a part of it, can be avoided by completely separating all impressionable
youths under eighteen from incarcerated adults.
The JJDPA will never reach its expected level of effectiveness if a vast
number of youths are continuously left unprotected by sight and sound
separation once they are incarcerated. Within the JJDPA, there appears to be
no explicit justification to support the difference in the implementation of
sight and sound separation between youths under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile justice system and those within the criminal justice system. Because
not all transferred youths have committed the most serious offenses,247 the
distinction drawn by the JJDPA between youths in a criminal proceeding and
youths in a delinquency proceeding with regard to sight and sound separation
is, to an extent, arbitrary. Just because a youth has been waived into the
criminal justice system does not make him or her less likely to become a
victim of abuse by older incarcerated individuals. Therefore, using eighteen
as a sight and sound separation threshold would be appropriate to evenly
240. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
241. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text.
245. See ARYA, supra note 5, at 7–8.
246. See id. (“By exposing juveniles to a criminal culture where inmates commit crimes
against each other, adult institutions may socialize juveniles into becoming chronic offenders
when they otherwise would not have.”).
247. See supra Part III.D.3.
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protect youths across the United States, much like the Supreme Court used
in Roper v. Simmons to eliminate the death penalty for youths under eighteen.
The OJJDP acknowledges that incarcerating youths with adults is a
“criticized” practice.248 Such statements by the OJJDP indicate that there is
no foundational or systematic rationale for why youths tried as adults are not
afforded the same sight and sound separation protection as youths tried in the
juvenile justice system and, further, why Congress has not implemented a
statutory amendment to the sight and sound separation protection. It should
not be left up to a judge to determine, based on a youth’s age, maturity level,
or any other factor the judge sees fit, whether such youth should be protected
from incarcerated adults. Thus, this discrepancy in the amount of protection
available to youths tried as adults needs to be rectified in order for the JJDPA
to fulfill its ultimate goal of ensuring protection to all youths within the legal
system.
CONCLUSION
The JJDPA has made significant advances in the protections afforded to
incarcerated youths in the United States. However, the JJDPA will inevitably
continue to fall short of reaching the goal of shielding all youths from the
various harms of being incarcerated with adults when a portion of youths are
not included in the statutory application of sight and sound separation. Just
because a youth is tried as an adult does not mean he or she should not be
protected from the physical and psychological harms associated with being
incarcerated with adults. All youths involved in the justice system deserve
to have their vulnerabilities legally protected. The JJDPA can protect them
from the identified harms by expanding sight and sound separation’s legal
application and by closing the federal loophole that grants judges the power
to determine whether it is in the interest of justice to allow a youth to be in
contact with incarcerated adults. Doing so will provide a significant
reduction in youth victimization and could even save lives within adult
facilities.

248. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 6.

